Abstract
Introduction
Mathematics acquired a distinctive and respectable status first and foremost owing to its apparently exact mode of thought and its ability to achieve rigorous results based upon sound assumptions. It was con sidered to be the "acme of sound reasoning" -as Kline describes it (Kline, 1980:275) . For the greater part of the history of their subject matter mathematicians did not find it strange to integrate their views on mathematics with their more encompassing convictions about reality as a whole. The Pythagoreans, for instance, believed that everything in reality is number. Leibniz combined his calculus with his monadology and Cantor even saw his transflnite cardinal numbers as steps towards the throne of God ("Stufen zum Throne Gottes"). The belief that mathematics reveals something about the "real world" received its first and lasting impetus from the Platonic conception of the world of ideal forms in which the mathematical e/de occupied an intermediate position. They resembled the true e/'cte by being immovable and eternal and like sensory things, they permit plurality within the same form -though there are many congruent triangles, the ontic form (eidos) of the triangle is a unity without plurality. therefore fully justified in his preference for the expression "mathematics that could be applied".3 This perspective succeeds in freeing mathematics from nonmathematical dilemmas, such as the question whether or not euclidean geometry was shown to be false by the simple fact that Einstein had to use a non-euclidean geometry in his theory of relativity. Stephen Kórner remarks:
What can be confirmed or falsified by perceptions -experiments and observations -is not a geometry or any set of a priori statements but a physical theory using the geometry. What was falsified by the Michelson-Morley experiment4 was not Euclidean geomtry but a physical theory using it. What is confirmed by experiment is not a particular non-Euclidean geometry but again a physical theory using it. Kant's thesis that Euclidean geometry is the geometry of perceptual space is just as mistaken as the thesis that the geometry of perceptual space is not Euclidean (Korner, 1968:69) . Does this mean that genuine mathematics could now be appreciated in its abstract generality without fearing any restriction from "experience"?
Mathematical platonism
The apparent abstract nature of mathematics leads to an assessment of platonism in mathematics. Benacerraf and Putnam call platonists "those who consider mathematics as the discovery of truths about structures which exist independently of the activity or thought of mathematicians" (Benacerraf & Putnam, 1964: 15) . This description immediately focuses our attention on the nature of "existence". The following question arises: is it meaningful to say that mathematical structures "exist" in the same manner as stones, mountains or celestial bodies? If the answer is positive, then we may have to restrict ourselves to a constructivistic or a strict finitistic orientation in mathematics. The most important consequence then would be that the infinite in mathematics has to be eliminated because physicists estimate that the universe is constituted approximately by 1080 atoms -indeed a finite number.
But why and how then is it possible for human beings to imagine finite numbers greater that the number of atoms (or elementary particles) in the universe? The number 101010 is already such a number.5 Since its "size" obviously is not exemplified in the universe one may ask: is it real or does it only have an abstract existence within the imaginative mind of the mathematician? The other option is to affirm a different "abstract" order of "existence" for mathematical "objects" and "structures". In this fashion modern mathe matics is often described as the science of "formal systems" (cf. Kórner, 1972:124ff.) Paul Bernays (1976) specifies the term "formal" by equating it with "mathematical abstraction", indicating to him that one only considers the structural elements of an object (i.e. the way in which an object is composed out of parts).6 He qualifies this characterization still further by saying that the mathematician studies "idealized structures" -thus implicitly emphasizing the crucial input of the active "idealizing" mathematician. This brings us closer to the meaning attached to the term platonism as it was introduced by Bernays in 1934 in order to characterize this particular approach to mathematics. Since then, it has acquired a general use in literature discussing the foundations of mathematics (cf. Bernays, 1976: 62-84). Bernays highlights one of the differences between the axiom system of Euclid and Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry (1899) as follows. Euclid constructs the "objects" of his theory, whereas Hilbert postulates them. For Hilbert the term "exist" is used in a context in which all links with the thinking subject is denied. "Since this foremost came to expression in the philosophy of Plato I find it appropriate to designate it as platonism".7 With regard to mathematics, he mentions the fact that platonistic conceptions extend far beyond the theory of real numbers, since they have also been applied in "modern theories of algebra and topology, where they have proven very fertile" (1976:65). To this he adds an important statement: "This brief summary will suffice to characterize platonism and its application to mathematics. This application is so In 1900 Russell made public his well-known antinomy -which can be formulated in terms of the ABC of set theory. Consider the set C with elements A and the prescription that elements of set C may only be those sets A which do not contain themselves as elements. Thus C = (A/A í A).8 Now suppose that C is an element of C (C e C). Every element of C, however, does not contain itself as an elementthis, after all, is the requirement for being an element of C. This implies that if C is an element of C, it must also meet this requirement -but then C e C implies that C e C. Suppose, on the other hand, that C <f C. Then C does meet the requirement for being an element of C, which means that C e C. In other words, C is an element of C if and only if C is not an element of C. CeCoCiC Puckert and llgauds (1987:147 ff.) argue that Cantor must have discovered similar antinomies perhaps as early as 1883. It was only in 1895 that Cantor revealed that his newly developed set theory is antinomic.9 Antinomies like these call for an account of the relationship between "thought" and "reality", between "mathematics" and "the real world". The legacy of platonism seems to have reached a dead end in the discovery of the antinomies made known by Cantor and Russell. 8 The set of ten chairs is e.g. not itself a chair and does not contain itself as an element. On the other hand, the set of thinkable thoughts is in itself thinkable and therefore does contain itself as an element. 
Does the intuitionism of Brouwer bring mathematics closer to "reality"?
The 
The conflict between platonism and intuitionism
In modern mathematics, in general, we have two opposite claims. Brouwer, on the one hand, abandons Kant's doctrine of the apriority of space but on the other hand at the same time tries to strengthen Kant's doctrine of the apriority of time. Brouwer explains:
This neo-intuitionism considers the falling apart of moments of life into qualitatively different parts, to be reunited only while remaining separated by time, as the fundamental phenomenon of the human intellect, passing by abstracting from its emotional content into the fundamental phenomenon of mathematical thinking, the intuition of the bare two-oneness. This intuition of two-oneness, the basal intuition of mathematics, creates not only the numbers one and two, but also all finite ordinal numbers, in as much as one of the elements of the twooneness may be thought of as a new two-oneness, which process may be repeated indefinitely (Brouwer, 1964:69) .10 Set theorists tend to see cardinality as the most basic notion of number. However, Fraenkel points out that, in general, cardinals could not be compared without the "explicit or implicit use of order" (1976:127; cf. Fraenkel et at., 1973:80). On the same page he grants that there is "hardly a doubt that psychologically the ordered set is primary, owing to our experience with spatial order and temporal succession, and that the plain set is derived by abstraction". However, since the plain set seems to be the more general notion (based on membership alone), and since mathematics usually proceeds from the general to the less general, it seems natural, from the logico-mathematical point of view, to begin with plain sets and cardinals before introducing ordered sets and ordinals (by adding the order relation to the membership and equivalence relation) (cf. Fraenkel etal., 1973:127). The implicit assumption in this argument is given in the starting-point of (axiomatic) set theory as such -the notion of a set entails the wholeparts relation which we met earlier with reference to Bernays' definition of mathematics and when we referred to an expanded idea of infinity, (Stegmuller, 1970:331) . From our preceding analysis it is clear that (i) the notion of infinity lies at the basis of the divergence between the different schools of thought in twentieth mathematics and that (ii) this notion ought to be clarified in terms of the interrelationships between the aspects of number and space. Before we reflect on the "mathematical side" of the real world we first look at an example of the amazing link between mathematics and the "real world".
6. An example of the amazing link between mathematics and the "real world"
If "pure mathematics" -both in the form of its platonistic mind-inde pendent conception of "objects" and the latter's acceptance of "infinite totalities" (which find no counterpart in "the real world") and in the intuitionistic individual-mind-centred solipsism -lack a structural link with a mind-independent and platonic-heaven-independent world out there, how is it possible to explain the remarkable applicability of mathematical theories to various domains of human experience? What brought Kant to the conviction that a natural scientific discipline is only scientific inasmuch as it is mathematical? It ('gravitation' -DFMS) is a scientific fiction suggested by the human ability to exert force. However, the mathematical deductions from the quantitative law proven so effective that this approach has been accepted as an integral part of physical science. What science has done, then, is to sacrifice physical intelligibility for mathematical description and mathematical prediction. In order to illuminate something of the remarkable history of the conse quences of Newton's formulation of the law of gravity we briefly pay attention to a well-known story, the discovery of the planet Neptune. Remark: The discovery of Neptune (cf. Kline, 1980:62-63 
The real world inherently displays a "mathematical side"
Owing to a long-standing one-sidedness in the history of Western thought the term "existence" is constantly identified with the reality of concrete entities, such as material things, plants animals and human beings. These things constitute the domain of "experience". If "abstract entities" or "properties" were contemplated they were transposed to a supra-sensory "intelligible realm" (as platonism did in all its various forms, traditionally also known as realism) or they were embedded in the creative powers of the individual (and sometimes: collective) human mind (intuitionism and other variants of nominalism). In order to answer this question one might be inclined to side-step the real issue simply by enumerating the sub disciplines of a specific special science. Suppose an adherent of the Bourbaki says: "mathematics is the discipline which ultimately studies (the formal systems) of algebra and topologf, then the striking fact is that the italicized words are not an axiom, theorem or conclusion reached in the study of algebra or topology -which implies that the given definition excludes itself from the domain of mathematics. Although one has to be acquainted with the contents of mathematics in order to be able to formulate this kind of definition, it does not imply that the formulation as such is special-scientific in nature -it remains the task of philosophy to answer this basic question. Along this line of thought one can differentiate by definition between philosophy and the special sciences: those intellectual disciplines which need to transcend their own limits when they want to define their field of investigation are called special sciences, whereas that peculiar academic endeavour which can handle questions like these within its own confines, is called philosophy. Furthermore, to actually delimit a special scientific angle of approach requires that one has to identify the relevant modality (aspect) implying that one must simultaneously distinguish it from other modalities. The mutual cohering presence both of identification and distinguishing stresses the necessity of a philosophical view on the cohering diversity of modal aspects -a view transcending the boundaries of any modally delimited special-scientific view-point. In other words, the very nature of modal abstraction (analysis) reveals the philosophical dependence of the special sciences. We may now return to our question: is the science of mathematics sufficiently delimited by describing it as the science of "formal systems"? According to the interpretation of Bernays, which identifies "formal" with (idealizing) mathematical abstraction, mathematics considers only the structural moments of an object, i.e. the way in which an object is composed out of parts. In a certain sense this characterization is both too wide and too narrow to delimit the science of mathematics. The first shortcoming was sensed by himself when he refers to the fact that all areas of research are concerned with structures -structures of society, structures of the economy, the structure of the earth, structures of plants, of life-processes, and so on (Bernays, 1976:172). He also realizes that mathematicians apply some kind of idealization in their field of study. When he said that mathematics handles idealized possible structures it is still insufficient, because every modal aspect is to be distinguished from concrete things which merely function within these universal aspects (cf. Diagrams 1 and 2 at the end of this article in order to see an overview of the different aspects of reality and an indication of the structural properties of an aspect). No aspect as such is a "concrete entity"13 -explaining why the only road to an explicit conception of these modalities is given in the nature of modal analysis. The universal scope of these modalities is clearly seen when we state that all possible functions of entities within them presuppose the universal scope of their modal existence -an existence which we can articulate explicitly only by means of modal abstraction, i.e. in the terms used by Bernays, by means of the lifting out of "idealized structures". The fact that idealization, in the sense of abstracting universal structural features, not only pertain to modal structures (aspects) of reality, but also to the structure of concrete entities (exemplified in everyday concepts such as cars, humans, stars, animals and so on), was not grasped by Bernays, with the result that he was unable to delimit the science of mathematics in a satisfactory way. The meaning attached by him to the term "structure", referring to the way in which an object is composed out of parts, is ultimately connected with the whole-parts relation which is, as we want to argue, fundamentally connected with the nature of the spatial aspect of reality.14 But surely, he did not want to say that the field of investigation of mathematics is delimited by nothing but the spatial aspect. It would simply imply a 13 Confusing aspects for things is the mistake of reification or hypostatization. However, as soon as we investigate the nature of the parts of such a continuous whole, we inevitably discover its foundational coherence with the primitive numerical meaning of succession, because a continuous whole admits of an endless succession of divisions. Every genuine continuum is infinitely divisible. In so far as we focus our attention on the totality-character of continuity, the static meaning of spatial simultaneity comes to the fore. But as soon as the parts of a continuous whole are accounted for, the static notion of continuity seems to change into an infinitely proceeding sequence of possible divisions. The two sides of this peculiar whole-parts relation is nothing but a demonstration of the fact that the original meaning of a modal aspect (seen in the totality-character of continuity) can only express itself in coherence with other aspects (i.e. in the case of the spatial aspect, in its foundational coherence with the primitive arithmetical meaning of infinity, analogically reflected in the infinite divisibility of continuity). 9. Without arguing it in detail, an analysis of the inter-modal coherence between the aspects of number and space can show that the rational numbers, in a semi-disclosed way, represent an anticipation to a retrocipation, i.e. they analogically echo the infinite divisibility of a factually extended spatial subject, while such a subject analogically reflects the numerical time-order of succession in its infinite divisibility. Therefore, the numerical difference between any two rational numbers anticipates the totality-character of continuity (similar to the interval as a starting point for the intuitionist continuum), but since this "difference" is itself "infinitely divisible" (the denseness of the rational numbers), the mentioned anticipation to the totality-character of continuity is, due to the divisibility of such a whole and everyone of its parts, referred back to the law-side of the numerical aspect. This property of the rational numbers justifies the qualification semi disclosed. The idea of the actual (or: at once) infinite is the first fully disclosed structural moment -at the law-side -of the numerical as pect.
10. On the basis of an analysis of the history of the notion of the actual infinite (systematically I prefer the expression: the at once infinite, to be distinguished from the successive infinite as its undisclosed counterpart) as well as the way in which it was used mathematically by Cantor (and since him in modern mathematics), I have conjectured that the only tenable account of its meaning is given in seeing it as a deepened structural moment within the numerical aspect, anticipating (under the regulative guidance of our spatial intuition) to the spatial time-order of simultaneity (all at once). Only this regulative hypothesis accounts for the inter-modal meaning-disclosure evinced in the notion of the at once infinite (actual infinity). 11. Owing to its ultimate reductionistic intention, intuitionism distorts the original spatial whole-parts relation by accentuating the partelement (with its implied infinite divisibility) at the cost of the wholeelement (with its givenness all at once). The intuitionistic theory of the real numbers and the continuum follows a kind of Wittgensteinean approach -it uses the "spatial ladder of wholeness" but immediately afterwards discards it while holding on to the infinite divisibility implied by it. 12. We may both agree and disagree with Weyl and Brouwer in connection with their respective accounts of the primordial intuition of mathematics. Weyl is correct in his emphasis on the fact that the infinite sequence of natural numbers is more primitive than that of the continuum, but wrong in his subsequent attempt to reduce continuity to the semi-disclosed meaning of infinity (the infinite turned inwards). Although foundational to it, the primitive meaning of infinity (the successive infinite) has no "privileged" position in comparison with the primitive meaning of space. In so far as Brouwer wants to include both perspectives, discreteness and continuity, in his conception of the basal intuition of mathematics, we have to support him. Nevertheless, we also have to differ from him with respect to his reductionistic (semi disclosed) account of continuity in terms of freely proceeding convergent infinite sequences of rational numbers that actually denies the totality-character of the continuum.
13.
It is permissible to develop a semi-disclosed arithmetical description of continuity, but then only on the basis of the acknowledgment of the irreducibility of the original meaning of the spatial whole-parts relation (determined by the spatial time-order of simultaneity) -for otherwise some or other dialectical tension will be the inevitable result (as is the case with intuitionism) Such a semi disclosed arithmetical description of continuity is also relatively justified in its restricted use of the infinite as something endless.
Surely, also a fully disclosed arithmetical description of continuity, using the regulative hypothesis of the actual (at once) infinite (in which the numerical time-order of succession anticipates the spatial timeorder of simultaneity), is perfectly in order, albeit only on the basis of the acceptance of the irreducible spatial time-order -because in the absence of this acknowledgment the outcome will be reductionistic and therefore inherently antinomic, ending with an elimination of the meaning of space by implicitly (in the use of the actual infinite) starting from its irreducibility. 14. From the perspectives gained in this rather unfamiliar analysis we are in a better position to clarify the internally antinomic evaluation of number and space both in intuitionism and among the adherents of the idea of actual infinity in modern mathematics {platonism). These two approaches indeed have arrived at positions which are not only contradictory, but which are also inversely proportional to each other:
• Intuitionism acknowledges time in mathematics owing to its emphasis on the primordial intuition of one, another one, and so on (i.e. due to the conditioning role of the numerical time-order of succession). Nevertheless, the "culmination-point" of this approach, given in its account of real numbers and continuity, had to use an essential structural feature of the spatial aspect16 -an aspect whose meaning is traditionally considered to be static and timeless.
• Platonism rejects the notion of time in mathematics altogether but agrees at least at one point basically with intuitionism -the acceptance of an arithmeticistic approach. However, it is precisely intuitionism's orientation to the arithmetical order of succession which causes it to view time as basic for our primordial intuition. Paradoxically enough, platonism's rejection of time in mathematics is actually founded in its emphasis on the static domain of the actual infinite -in other words, on the way in which cosmic time expresses itself within the spatial time-order of simultaneity.
• The ironical situation is that, in the final analysis, both approaches are arithmeticistic (i.e. trying to reduce continuity to arithmetical terms), but nevertheless, contradicting their true (arithmeticistic) intentions, both respectively had to use two essential (and irre ducible) features of the spatial aspect, namely (i) infinite divisibility and (ii) the time-order of simultaneity.
16 Namely the infinite divisibility implied by the spatial whole-parts relation. Koers 65(1) 2000:95-121 TÍ5 15. Cantor claims that our concept of number, which in the finite case is captured by "Anzahl" (quantitative number), ought to be subdivided into two concepts as soon as we proceed to the domain of the infinite, for then the concept of cardinality ("Máchtigkeit") is required (Cantor, 1962:181) . This brings us back to the question whether the concept of (i) ordinal number or that of (ii) cardinal number is basic to mathe matics. The former is basic to an undisclosed understanding of the meaning of number, while (ii) follows from the deepening (disclosure) of the meaning of number in anticipation of the meaning of space. 16. Axiomatic set theory actually captures -in consistent and indepen dent axioms -structural features of the inter-connectedness of num ber and space disclosed under the guidance of theoretical (modally abstracting) thought. In conclusion we refer our alternative account of the ontical (i.e. "real world' ') aspectual basis of mathematics as a discipline to a brief sketch (Diagram 3) of the uniqueness and inter-modal coherence between the aspects of number and space. 17 The integral coherence of the dimension of modal aspects and the dimension of entities ultimately constitutes the ontical connection between the aspects of number and space -delimiting the angle of approach of mathematics as a special science -and all possible entities, events and societal relationships that invariably function in these two modes. In the final analysis, therefore, the relationship between mathe matics and the real world is neither found in an ideal platonic realm nor in the creative powers of the thinking mathematician. What is performed by the mathematician is an abstracting disclosure of ontically given modal properties enclosed within the integral coherence of unique and irreducible aspects of reality -subjected to the overarching creational law-order determining and delimiting the on-going dynamics of intellectual development taking place within its confines. 
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